ROHME-7: migrate to Governor V2 — the one vote that unlocks every other
REFILED. This supersedes ROHME-5, which was defeated with zero FOR votes — not on its
merits, but because voting turnout never approached V1's quorum. The actions below are
byte-for-byte identical to ROHME-5. What changed is the electorate: total gROHM has grown
from ~222 to ~1,391, so for the first time since launch the 1,000 gROHM quorum is actually
reachable — IF holders delegate.
READ THIS FIRST. Governance is currently DEAD. RohmeGovernor V1 sets MIN_ABSOLUTE_QUORUM as
a `constant` at 1,000 gROHM and its bps parameters as `immutable`. Every decree filed to
date — five of them — has been defeated by turnout alone, and there is no admin escape: the
Safe renounced timelock admin at genesis, by design. THIS proposal must itself clear the
1,000 gROHM bar. gROHM grants ZERO voting power until you call delegate(), even to yourself
— that is the step most holders miss, and it must happen BEFORE this proposal's voting
snapshot (24h after filing) for your weight to count.
WHAT V2 CHANGES. Every threshold becomes tunable, with the tuning itself made lockout-proof:
- quorum floor 1,000 -> 100 gROHM at migration, and it is storage rather than a constant.
A follow-up decree (ROHME-8, already staged) proposes raising it to 600 as the durable
setting — low enough to be reachable, high enough that a passing decree represents real
participation. 100 is the migration landing point, not the destination;
- quorum is max(floor, 10 pct of non-excluded circulating gROHM);
- proposal threshold 0.25 pct of supply;
- voting delay 12h (was 24h), voting period 48h (was 5 days);
- a RAISE must be REACHABLE: it cannot exceed the non-excluded circulating supply at the
time it is set, so governance can never vote itself back into a dead-on-arrival state;
- the param guardian may only ever LOWER thresholds - an escape valve if quorum becomes
unreachable again. Lowering grants no capture power: quorum is participation, not
approval; a proposal still needs FOR > AGAINST, the guardian gains no voting weight, and
every passed proposal still serves the timelock delay under the Safe's CANCELLER veto;
- voting delay and period gain permanent CAPS as well as floors. V1 had only floors, so one
passed proposal could have set a 100-year voting period and soft-bricked governance.
ACTIONS.
1. Timelock.grantRole(PROPOSER_ROLE, 0x006f98318205e3cC570C54775687485c95D7E2D1)
2. Timelock.grantRole(CANCELLER_ROLE, 0x006f98318205e3cC570C54775687485c95D7E2D1)
3. Timelock.revokeRole(PROPOSER_ROLE, 0xaEd67488D40f910eead998067abdC90413d2bA14) (V1)
4. Timelock.updateDelay(86400) (48h -> 24h)
The Timelock itself does NOT change, so anything already queued against it, and every
contract that references it, stays valid. Only which Governor may queue into it changes.
WHAT IS WAITING BEHIND THIS VOTE. The moment V2 controls the timelock, the refiled agenda
goes to a 48h vote each: the quorum floor at 600 (ROHME-8), weekend-safe RWA bond pricing
(ROHME-9, was ROHME-2), ROHM/NVDA and ROHM/GME LP bonds (ROHME-10, was ROHME-3), and the
LpBondLister so future LP listings stop costing a decree each (ROHME-11, was ROHME-4).
Treasury capability decrees — governance-bounded reserve swaps (e.g. USDG into RWAs),
pricing and whitelisting crypto-native assets, and the treasury games/plugin system — are in
development and will file on V2 as they ship. None of it moves until this passes.
DELIBERATELY NOT BUNDLED. The FeeCollector maxHarvest fix (old ROHME-6) is NOT part of this
proposal and is not on the staged agenda; it can be refiled separately if the community
wants it.
WHAT YOU ARE ACCEPTING. A quorum of 100 gROHM at landing (600 after ROHME-8) is a far lower
bar than 1,000, and a 24h timelock is half the current delay. That is the point - the
present settings cannot pass anything - but it is a genuine reduction in how much
participation a decree needs, and the deployer holds the param guardian role. If you would
rather wait for organic delegation under the existing rules, vote against.